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ER-2-8673

6 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Proposed Memorandum for the President Concerning
the Psychological Strategy Board Organization
and Responsibilities

1. Attached is a draft of the subject memorandum revised to reflect the changes you requested me to make in your own draft of the proposed memorandum. I am returning your draft, together with Mr. Staats' memorandum of 1 May 1952 to you; Subject: Organization of the Psychological Strategy Board. The changes effected in your draft need a brief explanation.

2. One of your instructions to me has been very difficult to follow and I do not believe that I have completely succeeded in the attempt, even though I have stretched language at times to a point resulting in some lack of clarity. There seems to me to be a fundamental issue here which is raised by indirect inference in the report of the Bureau of the Budget; viz., whether the PSB is to survive and go forward as a significant and useful implement of government, or whether it is to be kept to such a restricted level of activity as to result, over a period of time, in a slow and painful death. I have discussed this matter informally with Mr. Dulles and General Magruder, both of whom are inclined to conclude, for some of the same reasons, that the adoption and application at full strength of all of the recommendations in the report of the Budget would substantially nullify the effectiveness and usefulness of the PSB. There is some merit in the statements in the report of the Budget that the PSB* has been guilty of doing some things which it should not have done and leaving undone those things which it should have done. However, this fact would not of itself warrant in the conclusion that the PSB should concern itself almost exclusively with high level future planning, having very little to do with current developments no matter what their order of importance. It is my position that the enemy still retains the initiative on a very broad front, so that defensive and disruptive actions are, at the present time, of almost equal importance as offensive actions of our own. To mention just a few illustrations, our side has sustained and is

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still taking a considerable beating in the fields of biological warfare, East-West trade (the Moscow Economic Conference), the forthcoming Ecclesiastical Conference in Moscow, etc. A half dozen or so developments of this kind can be expected in each year and, although we have a respectable record for predicting their occurrence, we have had the greatest difficulty in getting coordinated plans to frustrate them.

3. With this statement of the basic difficulty, the following brief summary of the proposed revisions is set forth for your convenience and ready reference.

4. Membership and Chairmanship. You directed me to include a recommendation that the Director be made a member to the Board; or, in the alternative, that he take his turn in the proposed rotation of the chairmanship. This is contained in the revised draft in paragraphs 7, 8 and 13. It should be realized that either change would technically require modification of the organizational directive of 4 April 1951. That directive provides for new members from "each such other department or agency of the government as may . . . be determined by the Board." It further provides that "The Board shall designate one of its members as Chairman." (The underscoring in both quoted sentences is mine.)

5. You will also note that in the Bureau of the Budget summary report on the organization and operation of the Psychological Strategy Board of 30 April 1952, it is specifically recommended (page 9) that "the permanent membership of the Board not be expanded at this time..." Also, on page 8 of the report it is observed that "The significance which the role of Chairman has acquired, however, would lend a significance to the designation of the Director as Chairman in relation to the concept of the Board's role." In context, it is implied that this is not desirable. The draft of the proposed directive from the President to members of the Board, dated 28 April 1952, prepared by the Bureau of the Budget, states in connection with the rotation of the chairmanship among the present membership that "the Board may, if it chooses, utilize the Director as presiding officer." While I have included a similar provision in paragraph 8 of the revised draft in the effort to obtain consonance with the Bureau's position, the relationship between the functions of the Chairman and presiding officer becomes somewhat obscure.

6. Relationship with the National Security Council. I have incorporated in paragraph 10 this statement: "whenever you" (the President) "desire to inform yourself directly of the work and views

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
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of the Board, the Board as a whole will wait upon you, together with the Director and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council." This is a further effort to conform to a similar recommendation on page 4 of the Bureau of the Budget summary report.

7. In paragraph 10 of the subject memorandum, there is provided in response to your request the view that the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board should attend National Security Council meetings "as required and pursuant to invitation by the Council's Executive Secretary." However, you will note that this is not consistent with the views expressed in the last paragraph on page 5 of the summary report of the Bureau of the Budget and the recommendation on page 6.

8. Relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With reference to your recommendation that a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or possibly the Chairman, sit with the Board, I have incorporated this in paragraphs 11 and 13 of the attached memorandum. However, you will recall that on pages 6 and 7 of the Bureau of the Budget summary report there is a specific recommendation against having the Chairman represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Board. It is assumed that the same reasoning would be applicable to any of the Joint Chiefs.

9. I have not endeavored to incorporate any of the other recommendations or conclusions of the draft material transmitted by the Bureau of the Budget. That material is directed to the Bureau's over-all study of the organization and operation of the Board since its establishment, whereas your memorandum to the President is confined to the requested analysis of the Gray report. However, I would volunteer one observation. The Bureau of the Budget has stressed the need for additional emphasis on the Board's responsibility for forward strategic planning. Strengthening the position of the Director would be of considerable assistance in discharging that responsibility. Such strengthening is not immediately apparent in the Bureau of the Budget draft material.



FRANK G. WISNER

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In compliance with your instructions transmitted in Rear Admiral Dennison's memorandum of 25 February 1952, this is a general analysis of the report of Mr. Gordon Gray to you, dated 22 February 1952, on the organization and work of the Psychological Strategy Board and the principal conclusions and recommendations indicated as a result of that analysis.

The first three of these conclusions stated hereafter were indicated in the draft of a proposed letter from you to Mr. Gray, which was transmitted to you through Mr. Lay. Since these conclusions are reflected in a letter you have written to Mr. Gray, to that extent this is simply a more explicit confirmation of the conclusions and the underlying reasons.

General Analysis

Mr. Gray's report is a thoughtful review of the events of the past few years which made the creation of this new instrument of government necessary and accurately traces the development and work

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of the Board since its inception. In addition, Mr. Gray has used

the report to state the progress which has been made in resolving
problems arising from the differences among the government agencies
concerned and in obtaining a concerted psychological effort.

Conclusions

Publication of the Report. First, it was felt that none of the
report should be published. In reaching this conclusion, it was
recognized that Mr. Gray's probable reasons for recommending publi-
cation were to assure a more widespread public comprehension and
acceptance of this Government's efforts in the psychological warfare
field. Also, Mr. Gray undoubtedly hoped to obtain popular support
for certain principles in the solution of jurisdictional problems
among the Government agencies concerned and the problems arising from
their varying attitudes in the development of a strategic approach to
the psychological effort. The merits of these objectives are appre-
ciated. However, the foreseeable disadvantages in the publication of
the sensitive and classified material in the report are overriding
reasons which amply justify your decision not to publish it.

clusion induced by a study of the report was that in the present world situation it would be psychologically appropriate and desirable for you to restate comprehensively to the country and the rest of the world why we are in a cold war, the principles and policies controlling our psychological effort, the problems that are faced, the work so far accomplished (possibly including the Board's part of that work), and the task ahead. Such a statement might elaborate upon certain of the most significant themes of Mr. Gray's report. It would provide an opportunity to clarify the thinking of certain segments of the American public and our allies, which may not yet be fully persuaded of the scope and vigorous nature of the American policy with respect to the cold war and its justification. Such a statement would do much to accomplish what are thought to have been Mr. Gray's objectives in the publication of the report. It would also provide an opportunity for you publicly to acknowledge Mr. Gray's contribution in the work of the Board and to reaffirm the position of the Board as a result of the first months of its history. It is believed that a suitable occasion

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could be found for such a statement, which might take the form of a radio address or a special press release in conjunction with any points you might want to make in a press conference.

Mr. Gray's Suggested Changes Concerning the Board. On pages 15 and 16 of his report, Mr. Gray has suggested four specific changes concerning the Board. One of these suggestions involve changes in the membership of the Board, the chairmanship and the relationship of the Director to the Board. Others involve matters as to which your personal views and preferences would be controlling. As a member of the Board and as its Chairman by the selection of the other two members, I hesitate to express an opinion on these matters. However, since it is felt that your request for an analysis includes Mr. Gray's suggested changes, I offer my views for whatever assistance you may find in them.

First, Mr. Gray has suggested that the Director be made Chairman of the Board, possibly without a vote. The attributes of the position of the Director are somewhat uncertain. The title "Director" would indicate a somewhat higher level of responsibility than I myself

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originally thought should be provided for the office. I am now inclined to believe that it should be so regarded in order that suitable and well-qualified persons of stature may be induced to take the position. The scope of the Director's responsibility has sometimes been misunderstood and deserves clarification. Otherwise, the position would really have to be downgraded to that of Secretary to the Board, and head of its staff. The Director now sits with the Board. Making him a titular chairman would add to his prestige and influence among the agencies represented by the Board as presently constituted and without derogating from their authority and control over their activities. The Director of Central Intelligence, who is the principal covert operator in the field which the Board supervises, should not be Chairman.

It is my suggestion that you consider this favorably. An alternative would be to rotate the chairmanship of the Board among the three present members and designate the Director of the Board as a permanent Executive Vice-Chairman. This would at least provide continuous concentration of one of the members on the work of the Board, and better expedite its business, but the Board is so small that it would then look

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slightly top-heavy.

Whether the Director as Chairman should have voting rights is also open to question. A four-member Board, which could divide evenly on voted decisions, is not desirable, but a non-voting membership might be considered stultifying. Actually, the Board does not vote formally. Its proceedings are rather in the nature of round-table discussions and its decisions have been unanimous.

Mr. Gray's second and third suggested changes that the Director sit with the National Security Council as needed, and that he informally report to the President at regular intervals, involve your personal views and preferences. I doubt if this is desirable at present. The Council always has the tendency to grow, and you have had to trim it down once or twice already. He can be called if needed by the Council or by the Senior Staff.

Mr. Gray's fourth proposed change that a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sit with the Board as its Military Advisor, also has merit. This would simply be a strengthening of the representation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Board meetings, also prescribed in the organizational

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directive. If you approve this suggestion, it may be accomplished by
invitation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the needs
of the Board require.

RECOMMENDATIONS

You have already taken the recommended action indicated by the
first three above-stated conclusions by your letter to Mr. Gray.

With respect to the other conclusions involving Mr. Gray's
suggested changes concerning the Board, I respectfully recommend that
you consider modifying or clarifying the organization and procedures
of the Board in order: (a) to make the Director Chairman of the Board
without vote; (b) that in this capacity he be called on to attend
meetings of the National Security Council as needs dictate; and (c)
that you indicate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff your approval of having
one of its members, preferably the Chairman, meet with the Board as
the need arises.

WALTER B. SMITH
Director